ABSTRACT In recent years, a type of cyberattacks, known as advanced persistent threats, has resulted in very serious losses to various organizations such as governments and enterprises. The APT has the characteristics of long duration, complex attack means, and strong ability to conceal themselves, which make it difficult to detect them. Due to the lack of proper means to protect the Information-centric IoT (ICIoT), the ICIoT devices are extremely vulnerable to APT attacks. Moreover, among the existing APT detection methods, most researchers adopt those that extract the features of different APT attacks, and most of the features extracted are local, which leads to the fact that the related methods have poor scalability, thus reducing the accuracy. Furthermore, the attackers can easily avoid the detection by changing the local features. In this paper, we find that it is inevitable that the infected host will generate C&C communication with the command and control server (C&C server), during the process of APT attacks, and the C&C domain names are the bridge connecting the internal infection with the C&C server. Moreover, a certain APT attack of one attack family, which is the assembly of the same APT attacks, tends to map the C&C domain names to the same IP subnet. Under the assumption that the APT attackers have limited attack resources, the relationship between C&C domain names of APT and IP subnet is inevitable for the APT attackers to get higher attack efficiency, which leads to the effective tracking of APT attack behavior. Therefore, we construct a detection method based on the domain names' graph structure. This detection method can improve the detection efficiency in the information-centric internet, especially for the IoT devices. And, at the same time, we employ an appropriate pruning strategy and a preprocessing method to reduce the size of data to be processed and improve the computational efficiency. This detection method can also reduce the detection range, increase the detection accuracy, and improve the robustness and scalability of the detection system. In the actual experiment, the data size we process is 257535071 DNS requests and 73136 domain names. The experiment shows that the C&C domain names can be effectively detected even with a small-scale seed domain names.
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to suffer from cyberattacks, especially the APT attacks. As an emerging technology, IoT is defined as a network which makes everything be able to be connected with the Internet [2] , [3] . When we regard IoT devices as the target to be detected, it is also necessary to consider the issue of privacy protection. Therefore, we apply the information-centric network (ICN), which converts network focus from computer terminals to data itself. Through a communication gateway module, ICN realizes protocol conversion and data forwarding between heterogeneous networks. The architecture of ICN supports the mobility of network nodes well, especially the applications in mobile networks and the wireless sensor networks of IoT devices [4] , [21] .
Moreover, we find that C&C domain names, which are related to APT attacks, will resolve to IP addresses during the C&C stage, so it will inevitably leave traces in the DNS record. Therefore, among all of the methods for detecting APT, detecting APT tracks through DNS records as dataset is highly necessary. Regarding DNS records as dataset is highly necessary. The methods for detecting malicious domain names using DNS records are mainly divided into three categories: blacklist-based method, graph-based method, and machine learning method. These three kinds of methods have the following deficiencies.
Firstly, since most APT attacks employ domain generation algorithms to obtain different domain names and use them for a short period of time, the method of detecting APT-related malicious domain names, which is based on blacklist detection, is basically invalid for APT. Secondly, the machine learning-based methods tend to extract local features (which are related to malicious domain names, such as extracting the readability of domain names, and time to live (TTL) as features to establish classifiers for detection) [5] . For this kind of detection method, the number of hosts accessing the domain names, the active time of the domain names, and the semantic characteristics of the domain names can be extracted through DNS log record, and then input them into the detection framework. However, the local features of these malicious domain names can be easily changed without affecting the attacker's efficiency. For example, if the detection system classifies the domain names whose active time is 1:00am-4:00am as relatively suspicious domain names, the attacker can set the time of his C&C communication to 11:00am-2:00pm, which will not affect the attack effect at all. Therefore, extracting the local features of malicious domain names does not reflect the full view of malicious attacks, nor does it guarantee the validity of detection. As a result, they can often be easily avoided by attackers. Thirdly, the graph based method is always poor in scalability and accuracy. Attackers deliberately map the relationship to normal communities, which will notably reduce the detection accuracy and scalability of the graph based method.
To avoid the above deficiencies, we put forward one detection system based on maximum connected subgraph algorithm in the information-centric network. Through studying the specific APT reports, we find that the APT C&C domain names belonging to the same attack family may map to the same IP subnets. Therefore, under the assumption that the malicious domain names are the limited resources for attackers, we can effectively detect the C&C domain names belonging to the same APT attack family during the C&C communication phase of an APT attack. To avoid extracting the unrelated features and ensure the detection system scalability, we employ a domain graph based on the maximum connected subgraph. We make the following contributions:
(1). We propose a method for detecting an APT attack family. We don't attempt to detect the entire APT attack path or all APT's behavior inside the compromised system. Instead, according to the similarity and characteristics exhibited in an APT attack, we focus on one single stage of an APT and one attack family inside the infected system, which reduces the detection range, avoids extracting unrelated features and improves the detection accuracy.
(2). We design a graph analysis tool with high scalability and robustness. Under the condition that malicious domain names and IP addresses are the limited resources for attackers and the attackers will not affect the attack effect or bring too high cost, we can well avoid the influence of ''noise'' and ensure a good detection effect. At the same time, the detection is difficult to avoid for attackers.
(3). We conduct experiments with large-scale DNS response logs and the IP mapping sets to evaluate the analysis tools we designed, which we compare with the known detection systems. The comparison results show that the analysis tools we designed have higher scalability and accuracy.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows, in Chapter2 we will discuss the motivation of the paper and we will introduce the system description of this paper in Chapter3. Chapter4 introduces specific experiments and results. Then, in Chapter5, we will introduce the related work of this article. In Chapter6, we will discuss the whole system and the future work, and finally draw conclusions.
II. MOTIVATION A. BACKGROUND
Now we need to introduce the characteristics of APT. We give the definition at first: the goal of APT attackers is to build and extend backdoors in the target system, and to steal critical data or hinder the development of technology in relevant departments; they can use professional and complex technologies to achieve their goals through different ways of attack. [1] APT show different characteristics in traditional cyberattacks, which make it difficult to detect them:
(1). Targeted object: As a description of APT, ''the target is very clear, no matter how long it lasts, an APT will never stop until the end.'' Unlike traditional cyberattacks, an APT always has specific attack objects. And it always tries to steal and threaten data, information or technology within the target system.
(2). Long duration: Different from traditional cyberattacks, which is limited to embedded malicious codes in the target Z. Ma et al.: Discovering Suspicious APT Families through a Large-Scale Domain Graph system, an APT will stay in a system for a long time after invading the system, [6] finds the appropriate opportunity, communicates with the C&C server in a short period of interval, enhances the authority inside the system or steal data, which looks very normal in a long period of time.
(3). Strong ability to conceal: weak attack activity within long spans, encrypted communication, complex attack technologies and many other technologies undoubtedly increase the ability to conceal APT attacks.
(4). Multiple stages: The characteristic of long-duration determines the characteristic of multiple stages. In this paper, we divide the attack stage of an APT into 5 main phases, external reconnaissance, initial compromise, C&C communication, lateral movement and data back.
(5). Being advanced: The characteristic of being advanced reflects in the diversity and complexity of the attack techniques. The main tools employed by an APT include: social engineer attack to collect information during the external reconnaissance stage. Most spear-fishing attacks that contain the 0-day vulnerability, water hole attack, and sql injection for initial compromise. In the C&C framework of an APT, the dynamic domain service and domain generation algorithm are used to generate malicious domain names and employ customized malware at the same time.
These features of APT determine that detecting APT is not an easy task. And we tried to expose the tracks of an APT through our findings in section 2.2.
B. OBSERVATION 1) OBSERVATION1
Since APT has the characteristics of strong ability to conceal and long duration, an APT attack will not be completed in a short period of time. So an APT attack will move laterally in the system, adopt dynamic domain service, long-time sleep and many other ways to hide their behavior. Therefore, even though we find the suspicious events conform to the characters of different stages of an APT in the system, it is difficult to determine that these suspicious events constitute one complete APT attack path. As a result, the method of constructing a complete APT attack path through the entire APT life cycle can only establish a detection framework, while cannot implement and evaluate the detection effectiveness in practice. [17] , [19] Therefore, we studied the characteristics of the different stages of an APT attack, as well as the traces that may be left in different stages. Then we would focus on detecting one single attack stage of an APT.
What's more, we find that it is almost impossible to completely defend against attackers that enter the network through network penetration. [18] However, when an APT invades the system, it will quickly establish a backdoor in the system, so it is inevitable for the APT to try to communicate with the command and control server (C&C server). C&C communication is a bridge between C&C server and the infected user inside the system. Therefore, detecting C&C communication is a very important way to detect an APT attack. As stated in [5] , if security specialists can identify malicious Command and Control communications, which plays an integral role as the bridge between attacks and compromised devices, malicious operations can never remain covert and undetectable. Furthermore, by studying some APT reports [6] , [8] , we find that during the APT C&C communication phase, malicious domain names belonging to the same APT attack family map to the same IP subnet. What's more, the mapping relation will help us expose the APT tracks. So we focus on the relation between malicious domain names and the IP subnet in an APT attack during C&C communication stage.
2) OBSERVATION2
Most of the detection systems are based on the similarity of the APT attack behavior. According to the malicious domain names' periodic access, connection time and other similarities, [9] detects malicious attacks based on the belief propagation method. According to the IP address intersection which maps to the malicious domain names, [10] detects the malicious domain names. Based on the similar communication modes of C&C communication in an APT attack, [11] exposes the APT tracks by using unsupervised learning. Going further to the specific APT attacks, we find that the same attackers or the same group of attackers' attacks exhibit this kind of similarity when launching an APT. For example, the web page obtained by the C&C domain names in APT1 [13] contains special HTML tags. The ke3chang [8] attack group exhibits the similar HTTP reply pattern. However, these similarities of the special tags and response patterns are local similarities, and attackers can easily change this similarity mode without affecting the attack performance. Therefore, we need to find out the similarities that APT attackers need to pay a lot to change for detecting APT behavior. And the relation between C&C domain names and the IP subnet described in Observation1 meets the requirement. The specific reason will be discussed in Observation3.
In general, the process of a malicious attack's upgrade and improvement is based on existing malicious codes. Combined with the original malicious codes, the new malicious codes will improve the infection mechanism and the effectiveness of the payload. This is why malicious attacks classified into the same attack family show similarities in behavior, execution, strategy, and features [12] , etc. So we conclude that most similarities of an APT will appear in the form of APT attack clusters. In fact, the similarities shown by malicious attacks are the basis for defenders to distinguish between malicious attacks and ordinary normal behavior. Then attacks exhibit similar malicious behavior after being clustered. Therefore, we will focus on a set of attacks which belong to the same attack family and try to detect all APT attacks belonging to the same attack family within the system. What's more, the attacker will repair vulnerabilities in infected systems and prevent from being affected by other attackers during the attack. Therefore, we reasonably assume that there is only one APT attack family inside the infected system. As a result, we will change from detecting all APT tracks and all APT communities to detecting an APT family inside the system.
3) OBSERVATION3
The source of malicious domain names includes three main aspects: domain names registered by attackers, those generated by dynamic domain service and hijacked normal domain names. APT attackers will employ two main tools to hide the C&C server. The first tool is called fast-flux which maps the domain names to different IP addresses. The other tool is called domain-flux which uses DGA (domain generation algorithm) to generate a large number of domain names, and each domain name is used for a short period of time, which reflects that APT attackers' domain names and IP addresses are limited resources. As a result, the C&C domain names mapping to different IP addresses must have an intersection, which also confirms our above discussion in observation1. What's more, attackers will not alter the mapping feature easily when attacking the compromised system.
In conclusion, through the above background and observation, we find that based on the assumption that the malicious domain names and IP address are the limited resources of attackers, we detect the C&C domain names belonging to the same APT attack family at the C&C communication phase of an APT attack, and establish the relationship between domain names through the intersection of IP addresses that are mapped by those domain names, which is difficult for APT attackers to avoid. We will discuss the system components and detection methods of the system in Chapter III.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN A. OVERVIEW
The entire system includes the following parts, as shown in Figure 1 , and the components of the system and their functions have been shown in next sections respectively. First, in the filtering part, the data set is matched with the popular domain name list, and the request for the popular domain names is filtered out. Then, the domain graph is established through the relationship between the filtered domain names and the IP, and the connected subgraph is obtained on the domain graph. Both of the two parts constitute the preprocessing part of the detection system. Then the part of the graph analysis will be discussed in graph analysis section in detail. Finally, a list of suspicious domain names come into being. The above constitute a complete detection system. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We encountered the following problems in the process of system design:
(1). How to convert the relationship between domain names and IP to the relationship between domain names, and convert it into the suspiciousness of domain names? (2) . How to effectively expand malicious domain names? (3) . When does an attacker intentionally map a malicious domain name to IP addresses that most normal domain names map to, and how should these malicious domain names be distinguished from normal domain names?
In order to solve the above problems, we make the assumption that a domain name that has a strong relationship with a malicious domain name can be regarded as a suspicious domain name. According to our research, the malicious domain names associated with APT will choose to map to the same IP address, so what defines the relationship between domain names is the number of common IP addresses mapped by domain names. We use the IP addresses mapped by domain names as a vector, and represent the similarity between vectors by means of vector product rather than the size of the intersection of IP addresses that domain names map to.
Moreover, we need the detect system to be scalable and can able to extend suspicious domain names based on known malicious domain names [23] . If we only consider the size of the intersection of the domain names, an attacker could deliberately map a malicious domain names to IP addresses mapped by a large number of normal domain names or employ the compromised normal domain names obtained by an attacker for the purpose of his malicious attack. As a result, during the expansion of malicious domain names, many unrelated normal domain names are classified as suspicious. Therefore, the improvement we made is to assign a weight to each IP address to measure the association between the IP address and the malicious domain names. We initialize the weight of the IP address by manually analyzing the proportion of IP addresses mapped by malicious domain names to the IP addresses mapped by fully normal domain names. And then, as one more additional malicious domain name map to the IP address, the malicious degree of this IP address, which is the weight of the IP address, will correspondingly increase. By this way, in the process of calculating the malicious score of the domain names and expanding the new suspicious domain names, the proportion of the IP mapped by most malicious domain names will be highlighted. At the same time, the problem mentioned in question (3) can also be solved. The reason is that when updating the weights of IP addresses, the IP addresses mapped by most normal domain names can only obtain relatively small weights, while a large number of normal domain names are avoided from being detected as suspicious.
C. DATASET
The dataset we use is the continuous DNS request information and corresponding response IP addresses collected from one of the largest domestic education networks. One DNS request record contains the following information: request
We establish a graph structure of domain names and IP addresses in DNS data set, and then find suspicious C&C domain names in the graph. The concrete graph structure will be discussed in the graph structure section. In addition to the basic data set, we simulate the data of specific APT attack based on ke3chang [8] , snowman [6] , APT1 [13] and one-year fireeye APT report [15] , including the information of C&C domain names and mapped IP addresses. The amount of the simulated data is 20 pieces, which can guarantee the scalability under the condition of a small number of seed domain names.
D. GRAPH STRUCTURE
At first, we establish the domain-IP bipartite graph G1 (N1, E1). In G1, N1 represents the node in the graph, including 2 classes: domain name d and IP/24 subnet ip. ip(d) represents the IP subnets that the domain names d maps.
(in the following we will use ip to simplify the description of ip/24). When the domain name d0 is mapped to a specific subnet ip0, ie ip0∈ip(d0), there is an edge e0(d0, ip0)between the domain name node d0 and the ip0, e0 ∈ E1.
Then, convert the domain name-IP bipartite graph G1 into a domain graph G2 (N2, E2, V) which only contains the domain name nodes, and N2 represents all domain name nodes in G1. When two domain names d1 and d2 have a common mapping IP subnet ip1, ip(d1)∩ip(d2)=ip(d1∩d2) = ∅, then there is an edge e1(d1,d2) connection between d1 and d2, and e1∈E2. 
At the same time, we define a vector W indicating the degree of association between IP and malicious domain names, and then we initialize W [ip i ] = 0. Assuming that x malicious domain names map to ip i , and y normal domain names are mapped to ip i , then
In order to avoid the malicious score of the domain names linearly increasing with the expansion of the malicious domain names, the suspiciousness of ip which is mapped to newly detected suspicious domain names mapped to is not as high as the suspiciousness of the ip that the initial seed domain names mapped to. Therefore, the ip which is mapped to the newly detected suspicious domain names should not be assigned a too high weight value. Moreover, we hope that as the number of discovered malicious domain names increases, the weight value of the ip which is mapped to the newly added malicious domain names will be relatively low. Therefore, when the weight of the ip W[ip i ] is updated,
n represents the number of iterations. Then we define the relationship between the domain names as rel ( 
Finally, we define the malicious degree of a domain name, which is the malicious score of domain name to be detected as mal(d i ): Figure 2 , a domain-IP graph is converted to the domain graph. Similarly, we will use the graph to describe a malicious domain name's extension process of the detection system. Suppose d3and d4 are known malicious domain names in the graph, all IP addresses are (ip1, ip2, ip3, ip4, ip5, ip6). Therefore, V(d1)=(ip1, ip2,ip3,ip4,ip5,ip6)= (1,1,1,0 =>rel(d1,d3)=2,rel(d2,d3)=6.5,rel(d3,d5)=4.5, rel(d4,d5)=4.5 =>mal(d1)=2, mal(d2)=6.5, mal(d5)=9 Assuming that the threshold δ of the malicious score is 7, the domain name d5 becomes a new malicious domain name, and joins the detected suspicious domain name sequence, and then updates the malicious degree vector W of the IP address. So the new W=(0, 0, 2, 5.1, 5.5, 1).
=>mal(d1)=2, mal(d2)=7.1 Continue to update the suspicious domain name sequence and the vector W until W no longer updates. Then the algorithm VOLUME 7, 2019 terminates, and the final suspicious domain name sequence is the detection result of the detection system.
E. PREPROCESSING
As far as we know, it is very difficult to handle hundreds of millions of DNS requests [4] , [22] , and many of these DNS requests are ''noisy'' information, which means that there is no impact on the final detection result, and these ''noisy'' information will greatly reduce the efficiency of algorithm. In order to simplify the process of detection, we will adopt appropriate pre-processing strategies.
Strategy1. Since some popular domain names are not owned by large companies or organizations, if these popular domain names are attacked by APT attackers, the number of victims affected by such APT attacks is difficult to estimate, which will not be within the scope of our paper today. And if an APT attacker attacks a popular domain name, its attack behavior is easy to detect.
In summary, popular domain names are difficult to be and may not be the target of APT attackers. As a result, we have 20,000 popular domain names and will filter out the requests of these popular domain names in the dataset. Finally, after pre-processing according to this rule, the data size has been reduced from the original 257,535,071 DNS requests to 1,498,136 requests, which is a comparatively small data to be processed.
Strategy2. We have studied the network map formed by the specific domain name-IP and find that each domain name exists in the form of a module based on the mapped IP addresses. As shown in Figure 3 , we randomly select 150,000 DNS requests for analysis. After pre-processing and filtering out the popular domain names, we obtain the domain name graph. We find that, as shown in Figure 3b ( Figure 3a and Figure 3b are only the different representations of the same domain graph) the domain names are mostly in the form of modules, and there is no edge connecting in different modules. Moreover, we further explore the different modules in the domain map and find that the connections of nodes between different modules are loosely or tightly distributed. Figure 3c shows a tightly distributed module, while Figure 3d shows a loosely distributed module.
Therefore, we think of the concept of the maximum connected subgraph-the path connection between any two nodes in the subgraph, but not the path between any connected subgraph. If there is no path connecting between two nodes in a domain name subgraph, the related malicious IP addresses cannot be extended from one node to another. Therefore, we employ the method of finding the maximum connected subgraph, and then an entire domain graph is converted into some subgraphs. At the beginning of the preprocessing, we start from every seeds' malicious domain, and obtain the maximum connected subgraphs of these seed nodes. which also plays the role of pruning, because the nodes, which are not in the connected subgraphs of these seed nodes, are completely unrelated to these seed domain names. In a similar way, we omit other modules that are not in the subgraph of these seed nodes, which means they have no path to the seed node. An isolated domain name node not belonging to any other module is also filtered out.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT
Our experiment was completed on a server with 4 cores, 32GB of memory, and 2T CentOS system. The dataset we process is DNS record from one of the largest education network. The data size reached to 30GB, including a total of 250 million DNS request records (precisely257,535,071) including IoT sensor device data [3] , a total of 70,000 domain names (precisely 73,136), and 4,408 request failure, which is incorrect domain names. We show the size of the raw data and the remaining data after preprocessing in Figure 4 .
A. EXPERIMENT RESULT
As shown in Figure 4 , a sub-graph is composed of a total of 136 domain names, 2357 edges, 10 marked malicious domain names. And 2 of 136 domain names are used as seed nodes. The threshold of the malicious score is set to 8. As we can see, the graph connection is very tight. During the experiment, within a total of 6 iterations, 85 suspicious domain names were detected which include all 10 marked malicious domain names. The time for completing the test is 83ms.
For another subgraph, which contains a total of 127 nodes, 871 edge and which is not so tightly connected, we set it to the same number of marked malicious domain names and seed nodes, and set the threshold of the malicious score to 8. With a total of 4 iterations, 32 suspicious domain names were detected, and 8 of the 10 marked malicious domain names were detected. The remaining two marked malicious domains were not detected because they were mapped to completely different IP subnets, which made the detection difficult.
B. COMPARISON WITH THE METHOD WITHOUT CONNECTED SUBGRAPH
When we compare our method with the vector detection algorithm using connected subgraphs, we find the final results of the comparison are the same, but the detection efficiency of the latter is very low. It is imaginable that during the detection, the global vector weight_ip needs to be defined to record the weights of all IP subnets, and the relation of the global domain names and IP subnet should also be defined. However, a large number of these records are not necessary, because the process of extending all malicious domain names only occurs in the connected subgraph of the seed malicious domain names. Furthermore, the subgraph is only a small part of all domain subgraphs. The detection time on the connected subgraph is 120ms, which is 0.12s, while the detection time on the entire domain graph is 463.96s. Moreover, when processing the subgraph in Figure5, the vector of the malicious scores of 53136 domain names is defined, but 99% malicious scores of the domain names keep the initial values and were not completely updated, which also greatly wastes computing resources.
Therefore, by obtaining different connected subgraphs in the domain graph, the computation space can be effectively reduced, and the computation efficiency can be improved.
C. COMPARISON WITH THE METHOD WITHOUT IP SUBNET
When processing the subgraph in Figure5, the internal graph structure based on the complete IP address is shown in Figure 6 , the originally strongly connected graph structure is divided into several subgraph structures without edge connected. Since there is no way to extend the malicious domain names between subgraphs without edge connections, the detection method based on the complete IP address is poor in scalability, which is confirmed in the experiment results: the threshold is set to 10, and 34 suspicious domain names are detected from all 136 domain names in 9 iterations.
In conclusion, with fewer iterations, the graph detection method based on IP subnets detects more malicious domain names, showing better scalability. We can take advantage of the extensibility of the IP subnet and cooperate with the IP address detection method to achieve better detection results, which will be discussed in the future work of Chapter6.
D. COMPARISON WITH SHORTEST PATH ALGORITHM WITH CONNECTED SUBGRAPH
In the same computing environment, the shortest path algorithm [10] found 67 suspicious domain names from 136 domain names in the subgraph shown in Figure 5 , but 24 of the 67 suspicious domain names belong to the 127.67.23 subnet. Among all the subnets mapped to the 124.67.23 subnet, 49 of them are normal domain names to be detected. 2 of them are tagged malicious domain names. Therefore, for the domain names corresponding to this subnet, when evaluating their malicious level, the proportion of tagged malicious domain names in this subnet is not so high, which means this subnet is not a malicious IP subnet to a great extent. However, the shortest path method does not consider the different impact of different IP subnets on evaluating the malicious score of domain names. The relationship between domain names is only evaluated by the size of the intersection of IP subnets mapped by domain names. Compared with the shortest path algorithm, our detection method does not give a too high weight value to the 124.67.23 subnet, and the domain names to be detected do not have such a high proportion in the detected suspicious domain names.
In summary, the shortest path algorithm ignores the impact of different IP addresses on the evaluation of the relationship between malicious domain names and it cannot effectively detect the situation in which an attacker ''intentionally'' maps C&C domain names to an IP address which is mapped by most normal domain names.
V. RELATED WORK A. ATTACK INSTANCE
There are many research works on the analysis and detection of APT attack characteristics. Reference [13] points out that APT C&C domain names are mainly of three categories: registered by the attacker itself, generated by dynamic domain names, and the hijacked legal domain names. Reference [14] points out that attackers mostly employ dynamic domain names to communicate with C&C servers. References [6] and [8] point out the map relationship between malicious domain names and IP addresses during the APT C&C communication phase. In the C&C framework of ke3chang [8] , domain names come from dynamic domain service, and the attacker frequently changes its IP address. Usually, the C&C server is mapped to an unusable legal IP. But in the three attack clusters of Ke3chang, all the connections between C&C servers share the same IP address. In snowman [6] attack instance, C&C domain names map to the same IP addresses, and most of the C&C domain names map to the same IP/24 communication subnets.
These are the basis of our current work research, which analyzes the characteristics of the C&C communication stage exposed in a specific APT attack instance.
B. APT DETECTION
We divide the APT detection methods into 3 main categories: signature-based detection method, machine-learning based detection method and graph based detection method. We will analyze these 3 categories separately.
1. Signature-based detection method: signature-based detection method is based on a specific pattern of an existing detected attack instance, and the signature is established for detection. Just as there is a similar http reply mode in the attack instance ke3chang [8] , there is a specific character 'Ke3chang','shfam9y' in the post of the HTTP protocol. This can be used as a signature value of the detection system. However, in order to dodge signature-based methods, attackers frequently change the strings. Because of the complexity and concealment of the APT attack, an attacker can bypass a specific signature-based detection system without affecting the attack effect, and the signature-based detection method loses effectiveness in detecting APT. As [20] says, if APT could be identified by a software signature, then there would be no need to call them ''APTs''.
2. Machine-learning-based detection method: According to the specific mode during C&C communication, [11] uses the HTTP log as the data set, and then uses the machine learning method for detection. Through the characteristics of periodicity and autonomy during C&C communication, [15] establishes a host communication network, and constructs an unsupervised learning model for detection. However, the advantages and disadvantages of machine learning methods for detection depend on the quality of training data [16] . In actual situations, it is difficult for us to obtain real attack data, which makes it difficult to guarantee the effectiveness and accuracy of the machine learning method. Similar to the related work mentioned above, the starting point of our method is also to detect the characteristics of APT C&C communication. The difference is that in order to avoid the impact exerted by the lack of real detection data on the detection results, we adopt the graph theory based method for detection.
3. Graph-based detection method: According to the phenomenon that multiple malicious domain names map to the same IP address and multiple IP addresses map to the same malicious domain name, the relationship between domain names is established by the relationship of IPs mapped by domain names. Reference [17] makes the assumption that a domain name to be detected that is strongly associated with a known malicious domain name is a suspicious domain name. Then, establish a graph of domain names, convert the relationship between the domain names into the length of the path between the graph nodes, and use the Dijkstra shortest path algorithm to find the suspicious domain names. The conception of [17] is very similar to this paper, but it does not conduct in-depth analysis about the characteristics of the malicious APT-related domain names. The map relationship of a single IP address makes the detection scalability poor, and cannot cope with the situation where the attacker deliberately maps to different IP addresses.
In summary, different APT detection methods are described above. The methods are different, and their detection effects are different. The above detection methods cannot fully cover all existing APT detection methods, but the starting point of these detection methods are the same. By analyzing the behavior pattern of the APT attack distinguished from the normal behavior modes, the universality of these behavior mode in an APT can make most APT attack behavior cluster together to achieve the goal of detecting an APT
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a detection system through the domain graph. The detection system we proposed explores the association between malicious domain names on the basis of the relationship between domain names and the corresponding IP addresses, and extends the C&C domain names by discovering that the APT-related C&C domain names map to the same communication subnet in ICN. We employ the maximum connected subgraph to preprocess the domain graph, which greatly reduces the scale of the computation. Moreover, we not only consider the relevance between domain names, but also calculate the degree of association between IPs and malicious domain names. And the malicious domain names are detected more accurately by increasing the weight of IP subnets that most malicious domain names map to. The experiment's results show that our detection system can reduce the scale of calculation and ensure the accuracy and scalability at the same time. Moreover, based on the assumption that the malicious domain names and IP address are the limited resources of the attacker and the attacker won't reduce the attack effectiveness, we can guarantee that the attacker can hardly avoid the detection of our detection system. As a result, our detection system is suitable for the sensor networks of IoT devices. More importantly, we show a higher detection accuracy than other detection methods.
In the future, we still have a lot of work to do. We hope that our work is not limited to the relationship between domain names and IP addresses, but combines the characteristics of domain names themselves, which are, the local characteristics of domain names, to achieve better detection effectiveness for APT C&C domain names. Moreover, our detection system relies on a given set of known malicious domain names, and is limited by fewer APT data sources and insufficient malicious information. Therefore, we can employ unsupervised learning algorithm to detect a part of suspicious domain names at first, which is selected as seed domain names for further analysis of the graph detection system. In the similar way, we can employ the unsupervised learning algorithm to obtain the magnitude of a domain name's suspiciousness according to IP address, and the IP address weight can be initialized in the proportion to suspicious domain name instead of the manually analyzed malicious domain names, which can improve the accuracy of the weight assignment of IP addresses. Moreover, we can make the IP subnets have better scalability and make the IP addresses have higher accuracy when establishing the relationship between domain names. Finally, we can study the characteristics of the periodicity and automaticity nature of APT C&C communication stage, and then study the attack characteristics of APT attack paths. 
